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Abstract
The Covid-19 pandemic has prompted debate about what factors cause wide variations in
mortality and infection rates across the United States and raised questions about what can be
done to limit the spread of future outbreaks. In the comparative international politics literature,
there are four explanations that determine how well a country can contain outbreaks: leadership,
state capacity, demographics, and state culture. Currently, there are no studies that show a
comprehensive evaluation of what has caused variations in mortality rate among the fifty states.
This study aims to examine state variation among the 50 states in the U.S. and its influence on
Covid-19 infection and mortality rate. The study will utilize a mixed-method approach to
determine which factors have the most impact on mortality and infection rate. Using a
multivariate and case study analysis, I aim to show how the four explanations predicted the
pandemic case and death rates. In the findings of this study, I found that several factors,
including Republican party control, urbanization, and race, predicted a state’s Covid-19
outcomes. The purpose of this study is to urge states to repair weaknesses in pandemic response
plans, address structural discrimination within the healthcare system, and facilitate national
cooperation that will better equip states with the ability to contain an outbreak.
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I. What Matters Most in a Pandemic: Four Explanations
In response to the SARS-CoV-2, a coronavirus similar to Covid-19 and transmitted by
direct contact, the U.S. declared an emergency public health response two days after the World
Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert on the outbreak (Schrag et al. 2004). The
SARS outbreak had a significant psychological and economic impact that suggests community
wide problems could have been avoided with better correspondence from public health officials
(Blendon et al. 2020). The lack of guidance raised doubt over whether the U.S. health care
facilities had the resources to manage a significant SARS outbreak. In a survey, 90% of
infectious disease consultants responded that their hospital or medical center had a plan to
address SARS, yet more than half (61%) expressed concerns about the ability of their facility to
detect, diagnose, and triage SARS cases (Srinivasan 2004). This uncertainty led people to believe
that the government was less capable of containing the disease.
Successful containment also depends on how the infected country perceives the
biological threat. For instance, China’s initial response to the epidemic was not to view it as a
public health threat but as a potential threat to political and social stability. Ignoring the public
health dimensions of a pandemic potentially results in potentially dangerous response actions by
the government. At the beginning of the SARS outbreak, public health officials disagreed on the
best response due to competing agendas and varying rationales on how to best approach the
issue. (Christensen and Painter 2004). It was only near the end of the outbreak that responses to
isolate SARS cases were identical, which includes public health officials seeking WHO approval
with transparent and quick responses.
Similarly to SARS, the recent Covid-19 pandemic caused public health officials around
the world to scramble in implementing effective containment policies. A wide body of literature
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covers cross country policy comparisons and investigates the determinants of Covid-19 mortality
rate. From these analyses, the most common explanation of varying death and infection
outcomes were economic factors, political institutions, and government interventions that have
led to various responses among the international sphere. The handling of the Covid-19 pandemic
in the United States mainly relied on state governor decisions. The United States contracted its
first Covid-19 case almost one year ago and has since placed the responsibility of controlling the
pandemic to state and local governments. Many governors not only implemented various
approaches but also enacted them at different points of infection in the country. The more
successful policies enacted to contain the pandemic are unclear. For instance, Governor Newsom
from California was the first governor to implement a lockdown order, yet later in the crisis
California had one of the highest mortality and infection rates in the country. These high rates
may be attributed to state population density, as some smaller states such as Vermont have done
relatively well in keeping death cases low. Generally, mortality and infection rates are still rising
in the United States and there are multiple theories on what influences these statistics the most.
The first theory is whether or not democracies outperform other forms of government in
managing a pandemic. Stephan Haggard (2000), professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at UC San
Diego, wrote about the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and concluded that democracies
manage economic and financial crises better. Haggard argues that the advantage democracies
have over autocracies to vote incumbents out of office allows the new government to use
pre-existing ties to the business sectors to coordinate decisive responses to manage economic
crises. Semi-authoritarian or dictatorships took inconsistent, yet quick actions in managing
financial crises (Guillén 2001). While democracies have been shown to manage financial crises
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successfully, a pandemic induced crisis may elicit different sacrifices the population will need to
make to contain it.
Public discourse regarding the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has circulated around
political systems, leadership characteristics, and state capacity. A large portion of the literature
indicates that democracy has a positive impact on public health and results in greater health
policy interventions (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Fujiwara 2015; Justesen 2012). For instance,
Cronert (2020) shows that democratic countries implemented school closure faster than
authoritarian regimes in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and countries with a lower state
capacity were quicker to do so. However, the disproportionate Covid-19 mortality and infection
rates in Europe and the United States suggest that such democracies are less equipped to handle
pandemics and epidemics due to polarization, inequality, and declining government trust
(Berengaut 2020; Bieber 2020; Kleinfeld 2020; Cepaluni 2020). The informed policy making
process of democratic countries are the same features that slow down decision making (Weeks
2008) and cause democracies to be at a disadvantage in quickly responding to pandemics
(Cepaluni 2020). Political features that perpetuate ongoing epidemics and pandemics
demonstrate that democratic or non-democratic regimes have no significant effects on the
occurrence of epidemics (Guillen 2020). This debate on whether democratic regimes respond
better is unclear.Although the United States is a democracy that has not fared well during the
Covid-19 pandemic, governance at the state-level has shown how some states can be successful
in containing the pandemic.
Since the pandemic has emerged as a threat to global and national security, U.S. media
and public health researchers have scrutinized the federal government for the lack of rapid
response in the pandemic’s early stages. The most common policy response in the U.S. and
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Europe was the implementation of stay-at-home orders which required citizens to remain in their
residences with very few exceptions. These were ordered by the states along with school
closures, mass gathering bans, and non-essential business closures. Although these policies have
been associated with a reduction in mobility, considerations for why similar containment
responses have resulted in varying mortality and infection rates may boil down to four major
types of explanations: governance and leadership, state capacity, contextual factors such as
geography and economic inequality, and state culture. The literature of cross-country
comparisons of the Covid-19 pandemic suggests that state capacity, political institutions,
political priorities, and social structures are the common political factors that explain the
variation in a society’s ability to respond (Bosancianu 2020; Guillen 2020).
In the United States, however, there is widespread uncertainty on what protective
measures or factors matter most in controlling the spread. Not all states that implemented strict
protective measures had low case rates and not all states that lifted restrictions had high case
rates. The efficacy of CDC recommendations have been doubted by state leaders such as
Governor DeSantis of Florida who have eased restrictions without severe rises in Covid-19 rates.
However, policies may be not the only factor predicting pandemic outcomes. Although the
policies may be important, state demographics and culture may also influence case and death
rates. Using the four pertinent explanations suggested by the literature, this paper aims to
investigate how state variations across the United States have influenced pandemic outcomes or
infection and mortality rates. We will apply these four political explanations to that of the 50
states to determine which factors explain differences in Covid-19 outcomes. This study will
incorporate two methodological approaches to examine patterns in state responses and which of
these factors best predict Covid-19 infection and mortality rates. The paper will begin with
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definitions and descriptions of the four explanations, discuss the design and result of the
empirical approaches, and end with the social and political implications of these findings.
Literature Review: What Might Explain State Variation in COVID Outcomes
Leadership in a Pandemic
Political leaders who emanate a serious consideration of expert opinion or crisis prompts
similar responses from citizens. For instance, an ethic of compassion emerged within U.S.
political discourse on the HIV/ AIDS pandemic due to President Bush’s leadership and the
administration’s rationale for implementing the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) (Boyd 2015). While PEPFAR drove American global aid programs, Bush’s
compassionate sentiment resonated with American Christians and encouraged the American
conservative to embrace AIDS relief efforts (Boyd 2015). During a crisis such as a pandemic, the
opinions of political leaders can clearly influence the political culture toward a crisis, especially
when individual actions can impact their own health and that of others.
In the midst of the global Covid-19 pandemic, many have speculated that not only a leader’s
actions but also their identity are reasons why a country succeeds in containment efforts. Major
news publications have noticed that women-led nations were better at handling the Covid-19
pandemic. For instance, the New York Times praised the efforts of Jacinda Ardern, Prime
Minister of New Zealand, for successfully eradicating and controlling Covid-19 outbreaks (Taub
2020). Angela Merkel Chancellor of Germany had lower death rates than Britain, France, or
Spain (Taub 2020). Most notably, Tsai Ing-Wen, the president of Taiwan, has led one of the most
successful efforts in the world in containing the virus due to contact tracing and isolation
measures (Taub 2020). However, these are only speculations. Bosancianu (2020) did not find any
significant associations between mortality rates and women-led governments. The conclusion
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that women-led nations have better contained the Covid-19 virus may be under exceptional
circumstances.
While women-led nations seem to be faring well in responding to the pandemic, the
question that arises is whether this is true for local government. In the United States, for
example, Ruth Carlitz, a professor at Tulane University analyzed the time that it took governors
of the United States to impose lockdown and found that women did not impose quicker
lockdowns to fight the virus (Working paper- Taub 2020). She suggests that any effect that can
be made by gender has been dampened by political partisanship. This is because Carlitz found
that Republican governors in the United States of both genders, delayed stay-at-home orders
while Democrats imposed them earlier (Working paper-Taub 2020).
These examples evidently show that crisis requires effective leadership. During the
Covid-19 crisis, Presidential leadership of the United States was heavily scrutinized. The
President of the United States is granted a wide range of powers (Genovese 1986). According to
Genovese (1986), the President must consider the pressures and problems they are likely to face
and what can be done to navigate them (Genovese 1986). The development of a Leader Capital
Index (LCI) by Bennister, Hart, and Worthy was used to examine the premiership of Japan’s
prime ministers. This study revealed that Japanese leaders who lacked policy vision and were
unable to communicate clearly were less successful in deploying power (Burrett 2016).
Dealing with crises in the present age requires anticipating problems and setting up of procedures
to reduce the likelihood of emergency policy decisions (Genovese 1986). A distinction that
Genovese draws that will be helpful in defining leadership later on is his definition of crisis
management, which is the attempt to mitigate tension and allow the other side to evaluate the
conditions and reconsider its options (Genovese 1986). Crisis management is aimed at avoiding
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mistakes and reaching agreements that will reduce the risk of conflict (Genovese 1986). Some of
the relevant pressures that a President may have to face during Covid-19 that Genovese theorizes
are the shortness of time to act, seriousness of a consequence and the reliability and timeliness of
information (Genovese 1986; Kaul 2020). One of the examples Genovese uses to illustrate good
leadership is President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During this time, President
Kennedy created the Executive Committee of the NSC (ExCom), which was a group of advisors
and military personnel who Kennedy decided could advise him in handling the Missile Crisis.
The formation of ExCom exemplified Kennedy’s determination to gather and process
information due to the high uncertainty and limitations of the situation. This story of history
further emphasizes the importance of a leader who is aware of political perils and determined to
know reliable and legitimate information to mitigate risks.
Given the broad considerations of leadership, the leadership in a pandemic specific crisis
suggests that coordinated US efforts could improve public health policy. A study on major
pandemics including AIDS, TB, and malaria show that these biological phenomena can be
controlled with policy making and efficient resource allocation (Kavanagh et al. 2019). For
instance, President Reagan’s inaction during the global AIDS pandemic contributed to its growth
while President Obama’s intervention during the Ebola crisis inspired international cooperation
to control the epidemic (Kavanagh et al. 2019). This study concluded that U.S. leadership could
help reduce pandemics, prevent future outbreak, and reduce climate-change related risks
(Kavanagh 2019).
While the investment of such health policies can have a beneficial outcome in a country,
the funding for these programs have not increased significantly since then. The Trump
administration requested less funds than what Congress appropriated which shows that White
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House leadership and support could have allowed greater financial investments (Kavanagh
2019). During a crisis such as a pandemic, the opinions of political leaders can clearly influence
the political culture toward a crisis, especially when individual actions can impact their own
health and that of others.
Personal attributes of leaders are why some leaders are theorized to be exemplary in
containing the pandemic. Huang (2020) considers “three examples of leadership: New Zealand
prime minister Jacinda Arden, Melissa DeRosa Secretary to the Governor of New York, and New
York state governor Andrew Cuomo” (Huang 2020). New York governor Andrew Cuomo has
been praised for his example of displaying American leadership for providing “compassionate,
courageous, data-driven, decisive, and mindful leadership” (Huang 2020). Specific leadership
characteristics and practices such as these are argued to make effective leaders during a crisis
such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Recent research has organized these qualities into six categories:
communication, decision making, humanism, innovation, realism, and core values (Kaul 2020).
If a leader embodied most of these categories, then they were likely to create several
opportunities to mitigate risk that were missed in the initial stages of the pandemic such as the
use of face coverings, cancelling travel, and screening employees and patients (Kaul 2020).
Policy Intervention to Crises
During the 1918 influenza pandemic, Philadelphia held a parade welcoming soldiers
home from World War I, while St. Louis decided to cancel its parade. As a result, St. Louis
experienced one eighth as many deaths per capita in that wave of the pandemic and a far lower
infection rate than Philadelphia (Adolph 2020). These two instances were used by policy makers
to encourage states to implement mandates that would limit infectious outbreaks. The public
health literature suggests that governments play an important role in supporting public health, yet
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disasters of large and small scales have revealed weaknesses in the public health infrastructure
that require economic and sociopolitical interventions (Burkle 2006).
Covid-19 has generated a wide range of governmental responses to prevent disease
spread. On the one hand, the effectiveness of government implemented mandates are dependent
on citizen responsiveness. For instance, public compliance to public policies indicates that voters
in U.S. presidential elections tend to make voting choices based on a candidate’s performance
rather than their policies (Lenz 2013) Citizens are also more likely to disregard expert opinion
when the candidate they prefer also disagrees with the opinion (Darmofal 2005). During the
initial outbreak of the virus, medical experts, epidemiologists and public health professionals
were fundamental to suggesting policies to counteract the spread of Covid-19 (Lavazza and
Farina 2020). Yet, in the U.S. for example, the need of state authorities to show that they had full
control over the situation resulted in the lack of preventive measures. In the attempt to not induce
panic, many countries have failed to implement clear advice on limiting gatherings, cancelling
crowded events, and postponing travel (Lavazza and Farina 2020). Donald Trump’s dismissal of
the pandemic by labelling it a “Democratic hoax” did not garner nationwide compliance with the
WHO recommendations (Lavazza and Farina 2020). Studies on the relationship between political
ideology and perceptions of the threat of Covid-19 reveal that conservatives perceived the virus
as less threatening, less severe, and more exaggerated by the media (Calvillo 2020). The same
study also revealed that conservatism had fewer accurate responses to Covid-19 knowledge tests.
People from varying political ideologies perceived the severity of Covid-19 differently
depending on how political leaders and media framed political issues.
Social distancing and mask mandates were the two primary strategies aimed to reduce the
spread of Covid-19 and number of infected individuals. A survey conducted among adults in
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New York City and Los Angeles found that stay-at-home orders, closures of nonessential
businesses, and adherence to Covid-19 mitigation guidelines were supported (Czeisler 2020).
Unlike that during Covid-19, the benefits of wearing masks during SARS were uncertain but
may have symbolized the individual and collective determination to contain the disease control
global spread (Syed 2003). A recent study by Adolph et al. (2020) shows how political factors
have influenced responses to implement social distancing measures. The most relevant finding of
this study was that states with Republican governors and more Trump supporters were slower to
adhere to social distancing policies (Adolph et al. 2020). In the U.S., residents of Democratic
leaning counties showed a greater reduction in mobility and Republicans practiced less social
distancing (Grossman et al. 2020; Allcott 2020). Tracking data from mobile phones showed a
partisan response to Covid-19 recommendations among individuals. Additionally, residents with
political leaders who recommended them to stay at home led to a decrease in mobility compared
to the effect of the Stay-At-Home orders themselves (Grossman et al 2020). Despite the expert
opinion to put in place strict measures, public compliance to the containment recommendations
across the country has not been successful.
State Capacity
As indicated by Bosancianu and Guillen’s studies, the first factor that most affects
epidemic frequency and mortality rate are state capacity and economic inequality (2020). State
capacity refers to the availability of the government’s resources to handle a crisis. The
organizational capacity of a state is imperative to effective policy making and implementation
(Guillen 2020). This development of state capacity explains why some countries performed
better in the long run during the outbreak (Guillen 2020). The lack of healthcare resources is
positively related to mortality rates (Ji and Ma 2020). This finding shows that pandemics will
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disproportionately affect countries with greater health disparities. However, Vietnam is an
authoritarian country with limited resources that has responded effectively to the Covid-19
pandemic (Klinger et al. 2020). Due to Vietnam’s ability to quickly mobilize their army,
implement a quarantine center, mass surveillance, and effective updates on public databases.
Vietnam has also efficiently produced accurate test kits faster than most developed countries at
the beginning of the outbreak. Vietnam’s containment response heavily suggests that the major
determinant of a country’s ability to mitigate the pandemic is through mobilization of the
country’s resources and society.
Similar to the situation in Italy as the outbreak surged, hospitalizations in the United
States have been exceedingly high. On November 1, hospitalizations in the U.S. hit a record
high of 62,000 (Stone 2020). At a national level, waves give a legitimate reason to be concerned
about the health system. Hospital surge capacity has been more seriously managed and the
possibility of epicenters concerns public health specialists about the risk of maxing out and
limiting the possibility of reallocating resources (Stone 2020). The federal department of Health
and Human Services have gauged the burden on U.S. healthcare systems by tracking the number
of beds utilized by Covid-19 patients (Stone 2020). The usage of bed capacity significantly
associated with an increase of Covid-19 mortality rate. However, some hospitals have been able
to expand their bed capacity in the past couple of months (Karaca-Mandic 2020). A closer look
at hospitalizations across the states captures the impact of Covid-19 on U.S. healthcare systems.
In addition to hospital capacity, U.S. state capacity to handle pandemic also includes
testing capabilities. In the early stages of the pandemic, testing operations in the U.S. were
delayed after tests developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were unreliable.
Since then, testing capacity has increased nationwide but many states continue to struggle in
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managing new outbreaks and tracking the virus. Testing facilities were also being overwhelmed
by processing delays and the shortage of testing supplies. South Korea took an international
cooperation approach in containing Covid-19 by sending test kits to the United States (Nirappil,
Cox and Schneider 2020). The $9 million dollar shipment was sent to Maryland where “public
and private labs had administered 71, 397 coronavirus tests” (Nirappil, Cox and Schneider 2020).
South Korean and Maryland state officials collaborated, negotiated, and discussed protocols with
scientists and physicians in an attempt to contain Covid-19 (Nirappil, Cox and Schneider 2020).
As exemplified by Vietnam and South Korea, testing capacities in the United States may have
been a determining factor of varying Covid-19 mortality and infection rates.
Inequality and Demographics
In addition to state capacity, economic inequality also plays a role in the severity of
pandemics. In studies across countries, researchers argued that economic inequality polarized the
economy and prevented the ability to adapt to evolving circumstances during a crisis (Guillen
2020). Since the pandemic spread across the United States, there has been a focus on how crises
often negatively impact disadvantaged communities, namely Black, Latinx, and Native
American. In the United States, the Covid-19 pandemic has worsened existing racial and
socioeconomic health inequalities (Wang 2020). For instance, Black Americans make up less
than half of the population in Louisiana, Michigan, and Illinois, yet in these regions 70% of the
Covid-19 related deaths are among the Black population (Wang 2020). Low-income
communities have also been disproportionately affected by the virus. For instance, New York zip
codes in the “bottom quartile of average incomes make up 36% of Covid-19 cases compared to
less than 10% for the wealthiest quartile” (Wang 2020). A similar trend was also found in
Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina (Hatef 2020). Health issues are
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exacerbated among these communities due to the lack of healthcare resources and access.
Underrepresented and lower income communities suffer disproportionately from underlying
health conditions such as respiratory illnesses that worsen Covid-19 (Wang 2020). Under the
recommended guidelines for prevention of Covid-19 such as washing hands and use of hand
sanitizer, low-income families are more likely to have limited access to these resources (Wang
2020). Socioeconomic inequities make the prioritization of health and access to health care
difficult. Due to these disparities, not all Americans are at an equal risk on contracting Covid-19.
Due to the lack of urgency in the U.S. response, disease disparities among communities
of color were accentuated. The inequities in mortality rates from the Covid-19 pandemic have
emphasized the enduring racial and ethnic inequalities in respiratory health in the United States
(Thakur et al. 2020). The recent death of George Floyd and the protests that followed highlight
the role of structural racism that resulted in the unequal exposure of Covid-19 across Black and
Brown communities (Thakur et al. 2020). Racially based policies have been detrimental to
minority groups and further accentuates racism in health care services.
State Culture
In order to mitigate a pandemic, cooperation is vital. Stopping a highly infectious disease
from spreading within a state requires cooperation among residents. The ability of residents to
abide by recommended guidelines that experts and leaders believe will mitigate the spread of a
virus depends on state culture. The most famous measure of state culture is Elazar’s measures of
State Culture that groups states into three categories: moralistic, individualistic, and
traditionalistic (Morgan & Watson 1991, p. 40). Elazar emphasized that political culture was
grounded in a state’s history and traditions, both of which influenced government action within
that state (Morgan & Watson 1991, p. 32-33). A brief description of Elazar’s measures of state
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culture are given: “The individualistic culture conceives of the political system as a marketplace,
in which individuals and groups advance their self-interests through political action... The
moralistic culture views government… as a vital force in the search for the good life… and the
traditionalistic culture allows an active role for government [while maintaining] old social order”
(Morgan & Watson 1991, p. 33). These three descriptions of political cultures reflect the
religious migration across the states, dispersing various traditions. In relation to the Covid-19
pandemic, Elazar’s measures could reveal if a state’s cultural values influenced their case and
death rates.
Theoretical Arguments: Four Explanations
Leadership & Implementing State Mandates
President Trump declared the Covid-19 pandemic in March months after the virus had
been reported to the WHO. The delayed response of the United States to track the movement of
the virus has resulted in growing cases today. Despite this, some states have minimal mortality
and infection rates while some have cases that continue to increase. For this reason, it is
important to examine individual state factors to determine why some states are doing better than
others. Instead of placing blame on the lackluster motivation for the Trump Administration to
contain the Covid-19 pandemic in the United States, we will look at the leadership of state
governors and the qualities of those states to find an explanation for why mortality and infection
rates drastically vary across the U.S. In many ways, the impact of Covid-19 was heavily reliant
on local politics. State governors are being held responsible for state-level consequences. It is
uncertain which qualities of a leader make them better than the next. The first quality that seems
to influence mortality and infection rate is the political party of the Governors.
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As established by the literature, Republican Governors have been speculated to be more
resistant to implementing social distancing and other protective measures. Additionally, residents
of these states are less likely to follow them. To investigate whether states with Republican
governors were more likely to also have higher rates of cases and deaths, Republican party
control will be examined under the leadership explanation. In addition to the political
identification of leaders, previous studies have speculated that the gender identity of a leader
may play a larger role. The next section theorizes why the gender identity may result in
differences in Covid-19 mortality and infection rates in each state.
At first glance, women leaders appeared to handle the Covid-19 pandemic better. Out of
the fifty states, there were only nine led by women at the height of the pandemic (Kayla and
Stajkovic 2020). The debate on the efficacy of women leaders during the pandemic suggests that
leadership identity was a defining factor in containment. During times of uncertainty, women
leaders are preferred across professions (Adams, Gupta, & Leeth, 2009; Ashby, Ryan, & Haslam,
2007). Qualities that make an effective leader during unprecedented times are “creativity,
improvisation, and intuition” (Kayla and Stajkovic 2020). Women tend to exhibit more of these
qualities (Hausmann & Güntürkün, 1999; Pagnani, 2011) which are important to diffusing
unfamiliar and life and death scenarios. In order to successfully do so, leaders have to be willing
to collaborate and share information. Women tend to have democratic leadership styles that
foster information sharing, brainstorming and cooperation (Bartunek, Walsh, & Lacey, 2000).
Women are also more likely to focus on health and security and utilize emotion-focused coping.
Harnessing a sense of psychological safety was not only a challenge for all leaders during the
pandemic but also a priority for women leaders. In stressful situations, men turn to
problem-solving coping (Ptacek, Smith, & Dodge, 1994). Gender differences are speculated to
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result in citizens responding differently to messages from women leaders compared to men. For
these reasons:
H1: States with Republican governors had higher mortality and infection rates
H2: States with women governors had lower mortality and infection rates.
In addition to the effect of gender, the timing of the implementation of stay-at-home
orders are also attributed to mortality and infection rate outcomes. Government issued
“stay-at-home” orders reduce the spread of contagious diseases, but the impact and effectiveness
of these orders remains unclear. In the United States, containment responses were highly
dependent on state and local governmental efforts (Fowler et al. 2020). Since containment
responses such as the “stay-at-home” orders were not organized at the national level, this creates
an opportunity for spatial and temporal divergences to measure policy efficacy with greater
accuracy. Based on the distribution of stay-at-home orders, the county-level growth rate of
Covid-19 cases changed relative to the day of the implementation of the stay-at-home order
(Fowler et al. 2020). The highest level of growth was three days before the state orders went into
effect (Fowler et al. 2020). Although it appears that state orders may decrease Covid-19 growth,
the data is uncertain due to the how many days infected individuals are contagious before and
after the onset of symptoms. This makes the efforts to generate an estimate of the effects of
policies that were implemented within days of each other difficult.
The impact of the stay-at-home order has been measured using publicly accessible
location data to analyze how population movement relative to stay-at-home orders changed.
Population movements will also depend on rural and urban areas due to varying population sizes
(Moreland et al. 2020). During the 14-day period after the first stay-at-home order was issued in
the US, there was a significant decrease in movement among the states and territories relative to

20
movement in the period before the state mandates (Moreland et al. 2020). A reduction in
population movement could potentially prevent person-to-person contact and limit Covid-19
exposure to those outside of the household. However, among counties nationwide in jurisdictions
where stay-at-home orders were lifted, population movement increased. Reduction of population
movement may suggest that the implementation of lockdowns and stay-at-home orders can
protect the public community by minimizing the transmission of Covid-19 and maximizing
containment efforts. On the other hand, it is possible that decreases in population movement
were attributed to national and state declarations of emergencies, gathering bans, school and
business closures, and sporting event cancellations (Moreland et al. 2020). The preliminary
analysis of population movements and mandatory stay-at-home orders suggests that the early
relaxation of these orders may have resulted in the continuous rise of Covid-19 mortality and
infection cases in the United States. Therefore, I expect:
H3: States with Governors that implemented stricter protective measures had lower
mortality and infection rates.
Economic Measures: State Capacity
The overwhelming panic that spread across the country about the lack of consistent
information about the novelty coronavirus was due to mixed messages from health officials with
testing. In the beginning, health officials suggested that we shouldn't get tested for the virus
unless people were showing symptoms (Cramer 2020). The message then shifted to say that
mass testing was essential to trace and contain the pandemic (Cramer 2020). Further confusion
ensued as public health officials warned of shortages of testing supplies and dealing with
increasing demand and long wait times for results. The lack of preparedness of the United States
thwarted contact-tracing efforts in locations with heavy outbreaks. At the same time, politicians
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in states where cases had fallen have urged people to get tested, whether they had symptoms or
not (Cramer 2020). The virus has been difficult to control in large part because many infected
people without symptoms have unknowingly spread it. More testing would have helped identify
cases early on and possibly prevented Covid-19 cases now. However, in the early stages of the
pandemic testing operations in the United States were delayed after tests developed by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were found to be unreliable. Since then,
testing capacity has increased nationwide but many of the states have struggled to manage new
outbreaks and track the virus as testing facilities were being overwhelmed by processing delays
and the shortage of testing supplies. The backlog left sick people undiagnosed, with the potential
to further increase the transmission of the virus as states opened. Better state capacity reduced
the frequency of epidemics (Guillen 2020). Thus, I expect:
H4: States with greater state capacity, such as testing, doctors, and health spending, had
lower mortality and infection rates.
Economic measure: Inequality and Demographics
Widespread testing capabilities could have also been essential in helping low-income
communities combat the virus. Covid-19 devastated disadvantaged communities (Clark et al.
2020). For instance, vulnerable immigrant communities in the US are at a high risk of
contracting and developing serious Covid-19 cases due to intricacies of poverty, limited access to
healthcare, and fear of legal consequences (Clark et al.). Sociodemographic differences also
impact the distribution of chronic diseases (Oates 2017). The “social determinants of health” are
described as “fundamental causes of disease”, which include income and education (Oates 2017).
Adults living under the poverty line are five times as likely to disclose “fair or poor” health as
compared to adults whose incomes are four times the poverty line (Oates 2017). Another
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predictor of variations in health is race. In comparison to whites, minorities face illnesses earlier
in life with greater severity and poorer survival (Oates 2017). The prominence of underlying
conditions among low-income and minority communities highlights inequities that the healthcare
system could work to improve. The lack of accessible and affordable health care options has
significantly increased Covid-19 cases in these communities. Focusing on the health status of
people in disadvantaged communities would be better for protecting the general population from
infectious outbreaks such as Covid-19. For these reasons:
H5: States with greater urbanization, poverty, and vulnerable communities to disease
such as immigrants and people of color had higher mortality and infection rates.
State Culture
In the prior section, state culture was defined by Elazar’s measures of state culture. While
this may be a prominent variable to investigate, another important factor to consider is
conservatism within a state. A state with a higher number of conservatives may influence
pandemic outcomes. There are many factors that suggest that conservatives respond differently
from liberal during Covid-19. In the United States, polling suggests that conservatives are not as
concerned as liberals about the pandemic (Brownstein, 2020). These differences in attitudes may
be attributed to different news sources that both groups consume. Conservatives trust different
sources of information than liberals do (Rodriguez et al., 2017, p. 259). Being unable to
distinguish between real and fake Covid-19 headlines would also lead to misinformation on the
virus and incorrect recommendations for mitigation (Calvillo et al., 2020, p. 1119). This would
explain why they have different perceptions on the threat of the Covid-19 virus. Conservatives
may also be downplaying the threat because they do not want government restrictions to be
implemented. From a psychological standpoint, acknowledging the threat makes the possible
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implementation of restrictions less plausible (Conway et al., 2020, p. 19). One example of the
avoidance of state restrictions on protective measures is evidently shown in studies on geo
tracking data. When the tracking data of 15 million smartphones were collected, US counties that
voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 elections were 14% less socially distanced between March
and May 2020 (Gollwitzer et al. 2020). The differences in distancing between pro-Trump
counties and pro-Hillary counties not only suggest that case and death rates may be higher in
these states, but also that the partisan divide has affected the behavior of U.S. citizens toward the
pandemic.
H6: States with more conservative citizens will have higher infection and death rates.
The hypothesis of the four explanations will be examined using the two methodological
approaches: multivariate and case study analysis.
Methodology and Empirical Approaches
While there has been substantial attention paid to variations in Covid-19 infection and
mortality rates across countries, substantial research within the U.S. is scant. U.S. Covid-19
studies have also highlighted how state-imposed mandates and timing of these recommendations
are correlated with population mobility. Additionally, the containment efforts of state governors
have not only indicated differences in how Democratic and Republican leaders impose mandates
but also how contrasting policies resulted in similar rates. This raises doubt on whether
implementing protective measures actually mattered and suggests that other state factors may be
at play. In order to determine why some states performed better than others, I examined how
state variations predict Covid-19 infection and mortality rates using the four explanations I
outlined in previous sections. By delving into these state-level factors, I am hoping to determine
which states have handled the pandemic better and how they were able to do so. I also hope to
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establish commonalities between states in which measures were common and resulted in
successful containment. These analyses will be used to justify how a state’s containment
successes could guide the handling of infectious outbreaks and crises in the future.
This study analyzed how the four explanations, leadership, state capacity, demographics
and other contextual factors, and state culture, predicted pandemic outcomes in the United States.
Using a mixed-method approach, I measured the four explanations (independent variable)
against case and death rates (dependent variable). The study will test the impact of the measures
against mortality and infection rates beginning with the month of March, the first month
Covid-19 cases began to increase in the nation. March was also chosen because leadership
decisions including the implementation of containment responses for Covid-19 did not begin
until former President Trump declared a national emergency on March 13. California imposed
the first stay-at-home order days later on March 19 (KFF 2020). Mortality and infection rates
were recorded at the end of each month until the end of 2020 in December. In doing so, we are
hoping to examine how state variations among the four explanations influenced cases and deaths
throughout the states. I constructed a data set of the 50 states of leadership, state capacity,
demographics, and state political culture and the dependent variables, mortality and infection
rate. In total, there were 41 independent variables analyzed. I determined that there were fourteen
variables that most influenced rates and analyzed them with a multivariate analysis. The second
approach included an analysis of two case studies comparing state variation. The first case study
compared California and Florida because of similar pandemic outcomes despite contrasting
policy differences. The second case study compared South Dakota and Vermont because of their
similar demographic features and contrasting policy approaches. We are hoping that both of
these approaches will reveal which measure or combination of measures were most effective in
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containing Covid-19 in the U.S. and comparing states to one another allows us to gain deeper
insight in what the country can do better in the future to control the pandemic.
Conclusion
Covid-19 presented the world with numerous obstacles and opportunities for people to
individually and cooperatively overcome. In order to better contain infectious outbreaks in the
future, state leaders need to work together to address the unequal ability of the population to
protect themselves from disease. This approach would encourage quicker production of medical
equipment and strive to help vulnerable communities in the long term. The creation of a joint
plan to share information and facilitate cooperative testing capabilities is why governmental
cooperation is critical to defeat a virus that is incurable. The pandemic has urged individuals to
think about the humanity of others and reconsider the importance of thoughtful leadership. The
importance of knowing which leadership actions and state factors were most impactful would
provide guidance on how to mitigate future pandemics. The following sections will describe the
empirical approach taken to examine the influence of state variations on pandemic infection and
mortality rates. The methodological approaches revealed that some determinants of state success
are more prominent and influential than others in controlling Covid-19. This methodology also
includes the analysis of two pairs of states that were chosen as case studies to weigh the
importance of policy implementation and demographics. Finally, the study discusses the social
and political implications these findings have on U.S. leadership, race, and state culture in a
pandemic.
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2. Determining State Success in Controlling Covid-19
Tennessee and Kentucky already have a long standing sport rivalry and Covid-19 appears
to have heightened tensions between the two states. The Governor of Kentucky Andy Beshear
acted a week earlier than the Governor of Tennessee Bill Lee to declare a state of emergency,
encourage social distancing, and implement business and school closures (Mattingly, 2020). The
decision of the Kentucky Governor to implement mandates and recommended protective
measures early appeared to lower infection rates in the first month of the pandemic. The
introduction of early intervention methods appeared matter in the case of Kentucky, but this
approach may not apply to every state that acts quickly in mitigating Covid-19. The following
section investigates whether or not early intervention strategies impacted pandemic outcomes
over time and how these outcomes have been influenced by state variations. Results of the
multivariate analysis show how the four explanations predict infection and case rates. The last
portion of this chapter covers the case study analysis of California v. Florida and South Dakota v.
Vermont.
Overall Mortality and Infection Rates: What Matters?
We begin our examination of state variation in Covid-19 outcomes by looking at how the
independent variables - leadership, capacity, contextual factors, and culture of a state - predict
the overall infection and mortality rates, our dependent variables. After determining the variables
that best explain the four explanations, we ran a multivariate analysis to see which were more
likely to influence outcomes which is presented in Table 2.1. From the multivariate analysis on
overall infection and death rates, we gather that there are five variables that predicted a state’s
Covid-19 outcomes, which are travel restrictions, doctors per capita, percent uninsured,
urbanization, and conservatism.
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Table 2.1. Models predicting Covid-19 Infection and Mortality Rates across the 50 states.
Variables
Infection Rate
Mortality Rate
Governance and Leadership
Republican Party Control
Mask Mandates December
Travel Restrictions
Women Governor

-75.164
(829.173)
-559.185
(382.085)
-1330.138**
(513.387)
-70.870
(660.182)

-9.471
(28.302)
-13.319
(13.041)
-25.573
(17.523)
1.746
(22.533)

8.302
(9.974)
-0.008
(.578)

0.897**
(0.340)
0.017
(.020)

-485.370**
(157.884)
879.812**
(488.408)
-125.291
(163.451)
-14.286
(43.200)
66.052
(45.108)
145.334
(90.661)

-7.971
(5.389)
33.343*
(16.670)
9.083
(5.579)
0.174
(1.474)
0.984
(1.540)
1.094
(3.094)

220.030**
(58.315)
383.616
(520.868)

3.393*
(1.990)
26.766
(17.778)

0.731
(-2670.584)
0.624
50

0.023**
(-626.552)
0.45
50

State Capacity
Doctors per capita
Total Health Spending per capita
Demographics and Context
Percent Uninsured
Urbanization Index
Percent Under Poverty
Percent African American
Percent Latino
Percent Native American
State Culture
Conservative Advantage
Trust in Government

Constant
R-Squared
Observations

Note: Statistical significance is noted as ** p < .05, * p < .10
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Under the leadership explanation, the implementation of strict travel restrictions seemed
to influence overall infection rate. Although there were a variety of travel restrictions
implemented by states, this was not a surprising finding because health experts warned that more
traveling would cause a spike in cases. Some of these restrictions include the requirement that
mandated travelers to have a negative Covid-19 test three days prior to arriving and filling out
surveys that acknowledged the traveler’s responsibility to quarantine. Some states did not
implement travel rules at all. While this is an important result that indicates that overall cases
were affected by summer and holiday traveling, it was surprising that none of the other
leadership variables predicted rates. In the overall rates model, the majority of the hypotheses
were rejected. We expected mask mandates to be significant because of its strong
recommendation by health experts. We also expected states with Republican Party Control and
women governors to also have more influence in overall rates.
The second explanation of state capacity also produced an interesting finding. The only
measure of state capacity that predicted overall mortality was doctors per capita. The model
suggested that a greater number of doctors per capita in the state was linked to greater mortality
rates. This finding could be explained by the relative number of doctors working in urban areas,
which would explain why there are more deaths in these states.
The third explanation, demographics and contextual factors, also produced unexpected
findings. Surprisingly, in places where a greater number of persons without health care insurance
resided, there were lower infections. Those without health insurance are less likely to go to
hospitals of their own conviction unless the situation was an emergency (Hadley, 2004, p.1527).
For this reason, uninsured persons may be less likely to get regular Covid-19 tests due to less
access to health care compared to insured persons. This would lower the overall infection rate, as
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those who are uninsured are less likely to obtain a Covid-19 test and therefore will not be
counted. This was the only measure of social inequality that mattered. I predicted that
communities with more people of color would be disproportionately affected by the Covid-19
pandemic; however, this is not what the results suggest. My hypothesis that states with more
people of color would have higher overall rates was rejected.
In explaining overall death and infection rates, two consistent findings emerged. These
common drivers of per capita rates are urbanization and conservatism, which is presented in
Table 2.1. A state with more urbanization was also more likely to have greater infections and
mortalities than rural states (Table 2.1). The same trend was found in states with greater
conservatism (Table 2.1). Some of these findings are not surprising. Urbanization results in
greater human interactions and more opportunities for the spread of the Covid-19 virus. We
expected that states with more conservatism would have higher overall rates. There are several
reasons that explain this finding. Data from News Gallup 2018 points out that conservatives
greatly outnumber liberals in the United States. There are only six states in which liberals
outnumber conservatives. Media politicization of Covid-19 may have consequently caused
conservatives to overlook the severity of the virus leading them to ignore social distancing
recommendations and protocols. The lackluster attitudes of conservatives across the nation may
explain its link to greater infections and deaths.
The overall model indicated that there was at least one variable from each explanation
that mattered in predicting Covid-19 outcomes. From this, we can conclude that overall rates
were influenced by a combination of explanations and not just one major determinant. The next
section investigates how examining pandemic outcomes change when analyzed over time and
across the various surges.
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Flattening the curve: For Better or Worse?
Throughout 2020, governors were extending lockdowns, reopening, and re-implementing
closures. At the beginning of the pandemic, all states had implemented a lockdown - some
months later than others. In the months to follow, state governors were calling for citizens to
“stop the spread” while some were doubting the efficacy of CDC recommended containment
measures. The aftermath of these decisions is evident in Figure 2, as various surges of Covid-19
infections and deaths spread across the nation. Although there was evidence of some flattening,
the summer months and holiday seasons tempted many citizens to gather with their friends and
families. For the rest of 2020, infection and mortality rates in the United States shot up.
Figure 2a. The daily and weekly trends of Covid-19 infections since March 2020.

Data provided by the CDC.

Figure 2b. The daily and weekly trends of Covid-19 deaths since March 2020.

Data provided by the CDC.
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In the chart above, the blue bars represent the daily cases and the red line indicates the
weekly average. Figure 2a and 2b indicate that throughout 2020 there were three surges of
Covid-19. The dependent variables were studied over three periods for both cases and deaths that
correspond to these surges during the pandemic. Trends on how state variations impacted
pandemic outcomes would not appear in one moment in time. As policies were changed, so did
case and death rates. Examining how pandemic outcomes evolved over time may reveal that
there were more variables of state variation at play that did not seem significant at one moment
in time.
In the models analyzing the pandemic over time, more measures were significant
predictors. The second model looked at infections over three periods and the third model looked
at mortality over the same three periods which were classified as one of the three surges in 2020.
The surges were defined by the time before and after a “peak” in the case and death data which
can be seen in Figure 2a and 2b above. Therefore, the first surge occurred between March and
April. The second surge occurred between May and September. The third surge occurred
between October and December. For the two models measuring the dependent variables over
time, the fourteen independent variables analyzed were the same as those analyzed in the overall
model. Results from the multivariate analysis revealed that when the pandemic was examined
over time, more of the four explanations were significant predictors. Unlike those in the overall
model, there were more variables within the explanations that predicted Covid-19 infections and
deaths. The significant predictors of infection and mortality rate over time is shown in Table 2.2
and 2.3, respectively.
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Table 2.2. Models predicting Covid-19 Infection Rates over time across the 50 states.
Variables
March to April May to September October to December
Governance and Leadership
Republican Party Control
Mask Mandates December
Travel Restrictions
Women Governor

-120.564
(157.070)
-32.613
(72.378)
-86.148
(97.251)
-11.945
(125.058)

555.930**
(236.038)
-163.842
(108.767)
-183.432
(146.144)
54.881
(187.932)

-221.398
(479.799)
-203.796
(221.093)
-599.699*
(297.070)
-146.193
(382.013)

5.540**
(1.889)
0.179
(.110)

-7.782**
(2.839)
-0.247
(.165)

5.225
(5.772)
0.194
(0.335)

-14.046
(29.908)
258.136**
(92.519)
51.730
(30.963)
-3.329
(8.183)
-4.416
(8.545)
9.623
(17.174)

-47.059
(44.944)
29.891
(139.034)
-6.279
(46.529)
33.484**
(12.298)
17.563
(12.841)
8.091
(25.808)

-312.973**
(91.359)
394.321
(282.617)
-132.036
(94.581)
-38.701
(24.997)
53.371**
(26.101)
79.916
(52.461)

12.367
(11.047)
155.133
(98.668)

-0.406
(16.600)
-112.531
(148.274)

147.947**
(33.744)
72.675
(301.399)

0.002**
(-4873.774)
0.52
50

0.103
(3674.052)
0.766
50

0.961
(222.296)
0.622
50

State Capacity
Doctors per capita
Total Health Spending per capita
Demographics and Context
Percent Uninsured
Urbanization Index
Percent Under Poverty
Percent African American
Percent Latino
Percent Native American
State Culture
Conservative Advantage
Trust in Government

Constant
R-Squared
Observations

Note: Statistical significance is noted as ** p < .05, * p < .10
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Table 2.3. Models predicting Covid-19 Mortality Rates over time across the 50 states.
Variables
March to April May to September October to December
Governance and Leadership
Republican Party Control
Mask Mandates December
Travel Restrictions
Women Governor

-10.695
(16.004)
-3.849
(7.375)
-9.709
(9.909)
-7.778
(12.743)

9.019*
(5.215)
-2.156
(2.403)
0.021
(3.229)
-0.754
(4.152)

-3.078
(8.810)
-5.112
(4.060)
-11.404**
(5.455)
10.100
(7.015)

0.495**
(0.193)
0.025**
(0.011)

0.011**
(0.063)
-0.005
(0.004)

0.138
(0.106)
-0.006
(.006)

-0.497
(3.047)
24.666**
(9.427)
6.868**
(3.155)
-0.782
(0.834)
-0.768
(0.871)
1.241
(1.750)

-0.265
(0.993)
1.953
(3.072)
2.116**
(1.028)
0.964**
(0.272)
0.581**
(0.284)
-0.651
(0.570)

-5.106**
(1.678)
-2.803
(5.189)
-1.257
(1.737)
-0.171
(0.459)
1.040**
(0.479)
0.125
(0.963)

0.595
(1.126)
12.911
(10.054)

-0.105
(0.367)
3.704
(3.276)

1.948**
(0.620)
3.028
(5.534)

0.003**
(-479.182)
0.471
50

0.434
(-38.42)
0.732
50

0.45
(62.7)
0.549
50

State Capacity
Doctors per capita
Total Health Spending per capita
Demographics and Context
Percent Uninsured
Urbanization Index
Percent Under Poverty
Percent African American
Percent Latino
Percent Native American
State Culture
Conservative Advantage
Trust in Government

Constant
R-Squared
Observations

Note: Statistical significance is noted as ** p < .05, * p < .10
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Leadership Matters
Although the overall model provided some insight in how leadership and governance
measures predict the rates at one moment in time, the effects of the pandemic may have evolved
over the course of 2020. For instance, many people have speculated whether Republican led
states or Democrat led states do better during a pandemic. While the overall model does not
show that Republican party control was a significant predictor, the models indicating how the
pandemic has evolved over time indicate differently. During the first couple of months of the
pandemic, Covid-19 cases and deaths were not driven by party control until the summer months.
During the second surge of the pandemic, from May to September, states with Republican party
control were more likely to have greater infections and mortality. According to a study done by
researchers at Johns Hopkins, Democrat-led states had higher per-capita infections and deaths in
the beginning of the pandemic (Neelon, 2021, p.7). Similar to the findings of this research, by
mid-summer Republican-led states had much higher rates, which they suggest may be due to
policy differences (Neelon, 2021, p.7). The two policies that this study observed are noted in
Table 2.2. Those include the implementation of a statewide mask mandate and travel restrictions.
While the enforcement of a statewide mask mandate was not a significant driver, this finding
does not undervalue the importance of masks as a tool for mitigating spread. Rather, this finding
should indicate that while there may have been the implementation of a statewide mandate, it is
not a guarantee that people will follow the proper protocol for wearing masks. Thus, there are
other state level factors that drive infection and mortality rates. The policy that seemed to drive
cases and deaths are the level of travel restrictions. States with leaders who implemented stricter
travel restrictions were more likely to have less infections and mortality. At the time the data was
collected in January, there were only a handful of states that implemented strict restrictions.
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While there many more states that implemented statewide travel rules, most of them had little to
no enforcement. The states that were coded with strict travel restrictions were also states that
closely enforced them. For example, Hawaii and Alaska required a negative Covid-19 test within
72 hours of arrival. Without a clear indication that the person traveling was not infected with
Covid-19, the state would not allow that person to cross into its borders. While some states
decided to implement stringent rules, there were many more states that implemented rules that
had a facade of strictness. For example, California and New York required travelers to fill out
forms mandating that they would abide by the state’s quarantine rules. Yet, these rules were not
enforced and were based on the honor code and morale of the traveler. These findings seem to
suggest that states that held travelers more accountable as an infected person of Covid-19 were
more likely to control the spread of the virus in their state.
In addition to the speculations of whether or not political party affiliation mattered in
predicting how well a state’s pandemic outcomes were going to be, there were also many
speculations about whether women governors led states with lower infection and mortality rates.
While this study suggests that there is no link between women-led states and cases and deaths,
others suggest there are less Covid-19 deaths in states with women governors (Sergeant and
Stajkovic, 2020, p.6). Reasons why the findings of our study may not match that of Sergeant and
Stajkovic could be that their data collection covered an earlier period of the pandemic whereas
our study covered the later end of the pandemic. Their study examined death rates from
Covid-19 from January 2020 to May 2020 whereas ours examined death rates from March to
December. How the pandemic had changed from its beginning to the end may explain the
difference in these findings. The difference between these two studies suggests that gender may
have been a more significant predictor at the beginning of the pandemic but not towards the end.
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State Capacity
The capacity or ability of the state to control the pandemic through protective policy
measures also varied over the three surges. During the first surge from March to April, states
with more doctors per capita were more likely to have greater infections and mortality. However,
infections decreased in states with greater numbers of doctors per capita during the second surge
whereas mortalities continued to show an increase. The difference between the infection and
death rate trends may be due to how state capacity influences the two rates. Doctors per capita
may be more likely to influence mortality rates as they have more control over patient care when
severe Covid-19 patients come into the hospitals. The lack of a Covid-19 cure or effective
treatment plan for infected persons suggests that doctors could not do any more than providing
supportive care. The options for treating Covid-19 were limited at the time, especially with a
nationwide ventilator shortage. The most effective determinant of lowering mortality rate was to
not get infected. Doctors per capita may have less influence over infection rates as they have less
control on the behavior of state residents. However, lower infection rates could be reflective of a
deeper understanding of Covid-19 and its remedies. Doctors could have advised their Covid-19
infected patients a treatment plan that prevented them from spreading the virus, such as rest and
staying home. Unlike that of the first surge, this finding suggests that more knowledge of how to
better control contagious spread across states helped mitigate the pandemic.
The second significant predictor under state capacity was total health spending. This
variable was only significant for mortality during the first surge from March to April. The
multivariate analysis indicated that states that spent more on health care had higher death rates.
This was a surprising finding as we expected the opposite trend to occur. As a nation, the United
States is known for its high healthcare spending, much of which is not due to better healthcare
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services (Anderson, 2019, p. 87). Higher costs of healthcare spending in the United States is
mainly distributed to administrative resources (Anderson, 2019, p. 87). Greater health care
spending by states reflects the general trend of healthcare spending in the nation. This measure of
state capacity reveals that states that had high healthcare spending were also more likely to have
high mortality rates because the funding may not be going to bolstering direct health care
services that could have treated sick patients. States that have spent more on healthcare did not
help in controlling the pandemic.
Demographics and Contextual factors
The Covid-19 virus struck hard and early in the urban states of New York, New Jersey
and Connecticut. Early on, New York became the epicenter of the Covid-19 pandemic and
Governor Andrew Cuomo implemented a shelter-in-place order ordering all residents to limit
non-essential travel and work remotely (Deerwester, 2020). The urgency to shut down in urban
areas was a good call as the Covid-19 virus was known to be extremely contagious through air
droplets. Additionally, there was widespread concern that the virus was disproportionately
affecting low-income people and people of color. Public health officials focused their attention
on addressing these disparities in order to better protect all communities (Godoy and Wood,
2020). The findings of demographic features, such as urbanization and race and ethnicity, on
infection and mortality rate reveal that vulnerable communities should be better protected during
a pandemic.
During the first surge, urban states were more likely to have greater infection and
mortality rate. Over time, the pandemic outcomes also revealed that the virus had
disproportionately affected the African American and Latinx populations. During the second
surge, states with a greater percentage of these communities were more likely to have greater
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infections and mortalities. These findings not only support the hypothesis that Covid-19
disproportionately affects ethnic minorities but also suggests that the pandemic has affected them
to different extents. For instance, the Latinx population continued to be significantly affected
during the third surge. The disproportionate effect of Covid-19 on communities of color reflect
the reality of pre-pandemic structural discrimination, which includes less access to quality health
care and jobs that were considered essential during the pandemic (Godoy and Wood, 2020).
African Americans also face more health risks and underlying conditions such as diabetes, heart
disease, and lung disease, all of which would be exacerbated by Covid-19 (Godoy and Wood,
2020). In this pandemic, African Americans were hit harder (Godoy and Wood, 2020).
Nevertheless, Latinos and Hispanics were also testing positive for Covid-19 at high rates (Godoy
and Wood, 2020). Several explanations for why we might have observed that the Latino
population was more affected by the pandemic than African Americans in the third surge may be
because they are more likely to live multi-generational households, over-representation as
essential workers, and high rates of poverty (Godoy and Wood, 2020). There may also be more
distrust among the Latino community in contact tracing due to their undocumented status, which
hinders them from saying who they have been in contact with and leads to the inability to trace
infections (Godoy and Wood, 2020). The Covid-19 has highlighted racial inequalities that
urgently need to be addressed.
When comparing what affected infections and mortalities, there were more economic
disparities that were correlated with mortalities. States with a greater percentage of those living
under poverty were more likely to have greater mortality rates, but not infections. Several factors
explain this finding. People of lower socio-ecnomic status are more likely to live in overcrowded
places (Patel, 2020, p. 110). States implementing lockdowns disregarded that not every person
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has the luxury of being able to live spaciously. One consistent driving factor of infections and
mortality is that during the third surge, findings revealed that a state with a greater percentage of
those without health insurance were also states with fewer infections and mortalities. While this
may seem counterintuitive, this finding makes sense if we consider how those who are without
health insurance are more likely to get tested and go to the hospital for any treatments unless it is
an emergency. They may have avoided getting tested and receiving necessary care if they also
did not know about the U.S. Department Health and Human Services reimbursement program for
uninsured persons (Schwartx and Tolbert, 2020). Health care providers were not mandated to
participate in the program, which further decreases its accessibility (Schwartx and Tolbert, 2020).
People who were uninsured during the pandemic were also not guaranteed to receive a full
reimbursement as the program only runs on contingent funding (Schwartx and Tolbert, 2020).
Both of these demographic groups - people living under poverty and/ or living without health
insurance - were potentially put under exacerbated stress due to the pandemic. Consistently
living in financial uncertainty negatively impacts mental health and worsens stress, which
weakens the immune system (Patel, 2020, p.110). This increases this demographic’s
susceptibility to a range of diseases (Patel, 2020, p. 110) and puts them more at risk of
contracting Covid-19. The pandemic has pinpointed that the economically disadvantaged are
physically vulnerable to disease and suggests that policymakers should address social welfare
issues to improve public health.
State Culture
The Covid-19 pandemic has been politicised in the United States causing varying
responses from the public. Under the explanation of state culture, the attitudes and behaviors of
citizens within a state affect pandemic outcomes. In the models that predict pandemic outcomes
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over time, conservatism or states with more conservative citizens was a significant predictor in
the third surge. By the time of the third surge from October to December, protective policies
began to relax and the behaviors of state citizens toward Covid-19 began to reveal itself. This
finding is consistent with a study done by researchers Kerr, Panagopoulos, and Linden who
found that liberals, as opposed to conservatives, were more likely to perceive Covid-19 as a
higher risk, trust health experts, and criticize governors and the federal government in their
response (2020). This polarization extends beyond differing attitudes and also applies to the level
of engagement in various protective behaviors such as social distancing, wearing face masks, and
staying home during lockdowns (Kerr, Panagopoulos, Linden, 2020). Since liberals appear to
take the Covid-19 pandemic more seriously, they may also be more likely to adhere to
containment measures and proper use of personal protective equipment. Conservatives may not
take these recommendations as seriously, which would suggest why states with more
conservative people would also have higher infection and mortality rate. The debate on the
efficacy of these Covid-19 mandates has evolved from a health issue to a political issue. In
reality, conservatives have a disadvantage when it comes to overcoming Covid-19.
Qualitative Approach: Case Study of California v. Florida
Moving beyond general predictors, we also conducted two case studies. The two case
studies are pairs of states that we have chosen based on the four explanations. The first pair that
we compare is California and Florida. The second pair that we compare is South Dakota and
Vermont. This will allow us to gain a comprehensive insight into which state variations were
better in containing Covid-19. This will also allow us to compare leadership choices of each
governor and whether each one’s approach and attitude toward Covid-19 affected the state’s
outcomes. To begin, we will first begin the case study analysis with California and Florida.
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The significance of Covid-19 policy approaches between California and Florida reflects
the politicization of the pandemic across the nation. California and Florida are led by governors
from opposite parties, both of which implemented drastically different Covid-19 policies, yet
resulted in similar pandemic outcomes. California is led by Governor Gavin Newsom who was
the leading state to implement a statewide lockdown and strict protective measures in an attempt
to mitigate Covid-19 (Table 3.1). On the other hand, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis not only
ordered a stay-at-home order roughly two weeks after Newsom but also eased Florida’s
restrictions much quicker. Despite these very different policy approaches, Table 3.1 suggests
that the differences reveal that California's strict responses did not significantly lower its
infection and mortality rates. This is because California and Florida’s cases and death rates are
similar. However, Florida’s death rate has consistently been higher than California’s.
Table 3.1. Covid-19 containment measures in California and Florida.
California

Florida

Infection per 100,000 (March
13)

8918

9018

Mortality per 100,000 (March
13)

139

150

Total Party Control

Democrat

Republican

Mask Mandates December

Statewide mandates

No statewide mandates

Travel

Loose travel restrictions

No travel restrictions

Restaurant Closures (Jan. 21)

Take-out & Delivery only

No restaurant occupancy
enforcements

School closures: 2019-2020
year

Recommended closure

Recommended closure

School closures: 2020-2021
year

Partial closure in effect

Ordered open
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Doctors per capita

279.6

265.2

Total health spending per
capita

1355

728

Urbanization index

12.19

11.46

Conservative advantage

0

14

Trust in government

Below average trust

Below average trust

During the second surge, California and Florida’s difference in infection rate was highest by the
end of September with California’s rate at 2052 per 100K and Florida at 3250 per 100K. Only in
the winter did the rate begin inching closer together. At the beginning of January, California’s
rate was 6052 per 100 K and Florida’s was 6245 per 100K. Figure (number) represents the trends
of California and Florida’s infection and death rate over the course of 2020.
Figure 3a and 3b. Comparison chart of California and Florida’s infection and death rates,
respectively.

During the period of time that California and Florida rates began to become more similar (Figure
3a), there are three possibilities that could explain what occurred. The first possibility is that
California’s strict policy implementation is what prevented their death rate from climbing like
that of Florida’s. The second possibility is a delayed onset of demographic differences that
caused similarities in infection rates. The third possibility is that both policy implementation and
demographic features influenced cases and deaths. After reviewing the demographic data
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collected in Table 3.2, California does have some disadvantages that may explain why the rates
inched closer to Florida’s as the year progressed. These demographic differences may have
contributed to why the significantly different policy approaches resulted in similar infection and
mortality rates of California and Florida.
Table 3.2 Demographic Differences of California and Florida.
California

Florida

Total Population Estimates

39,512, 223

21, 447, 737

Population Density

256

410

Percent African American

5.3

15

Percent Latino

39.5

26.6

Percent Native American

1.9

0.77

Percent with disabilities,
under age 65 years

6.7

8.6

Percent Uninsured

7.8

13.1

Percent of persons over age
65 years

14.8

16.5

Nursing home deaths per 100
residents

2.27

0.72

Percent in poverty

11.8

12.7

Unemployment Rate (%)

9

6.1

California has higher levels of Latinos, which were shown to be consistently affected by
the pandemic in the second and third surges. Additionally, “55% of California residents live in
counties with a high “social vulnerability score” which is an estimated measure of the severity of
a disease outbreak affecting that region (Karlamangla and Lin II, 2021). On the other hand, only
25% of Florida residents live in counties with high vulnerability scores (Karlamangla and Lin II,
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2021). In comparison to Florida, California also has a more persistent flu and pneumonia season
(Karlamangla and Lin II, 2021). There is also speculation that the climate can impact the
longevity of droplets staying in the air (Karlamangla and Lin II, 2021). In humid areas such as
Florida, climate experts suggested that Covid-19 droplets are more likely to fall faster than in
locations with less humidity (Karlamangla and Lin II, 2021). All of these factors combined,
suggest that California is more susceptible to disease spread than Florida. If Newsom’s policies
were similar to that of DeSantos, California’s case and death rates may have been worse.
Additionally, California was not only the first state to lockdown at the beginning of the
pandemic, but was one of the states that implemented among the most restrictive policies in the
nation. California was also among the states that implemented contradictory policies in closing
down schools yet opening up restaurants and bars.
Florida’s Republican Governor DeSantis is taking advantage of the situation in promoting
his status for the upcoming election. DeSantis is the youngest governor in the nation at 42 years
old and has been garnering attention from his peers due to Florida’s apparent success in
managing the Covid-19 pandemic. In an interview he stated: “Everyone told me I was wrong… I
faced continued pressure from radical Democrats and the liberal media, but I refused to back
down. It’s clear: Florida got it right” (Zeleny, 2021). Although Florida’s relaxed policies resulted
in similar case and death rates as California, DeSantis is receiving praise whereas California’s
Governor, Gavin Newsom is receiving backlash on his Covid-19 policy.
Although Florida decided to take a relaxed policy approach in controlling the pandemic,
the state is still doing better than half the nation. Along with California, Florida falls into the
center of state rankings on Covid-19 metrics. The situation in Florida and California has
highlighted how politics of the pandemic has and will influence future governor elections. For
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instance, the implementation of pandemic policies such as lockdowns and school reopenings are
going to be a measure for constituents in holding their governor accountable in mitigating the
pandemic (Zeleny, 2021). DeStantis is in a good position on being re-elected in comparison to
Newsom, who took more restrictive measures. Many Californians were angered by Newsom’s
approach to contain Covid-19 (Reston, 2021). Newsom implemented a restrictive lockdown
during the winter holiday season with the intention that this would control the spread as cases
were increasing and hospitals were reaching capacity (Reston, 2021). Although DeSantis decided
to lockdown within the first months of the outbreak, he did not enforce statewide masks
mandates, travel restrictions, or business closures (Table 3.1). Florida’s unemployment rate is
also lower than that of California’s, which makes Newsom’s enforcement of restrictive policies
appear less effective and DeSantis’ decision to stay open more effective. DeSantis restricted
cities and counties from fining residents who choose not to wear masks and is facing pushback
from local officials who believe that their local authority is being taken away (Zeleny, 2021). All
governors in the nation were responsible for balancing the protection of residents while
maintaining the economy. DeSantis’ decision to fully reopen the economy didn’t result in the
spike in deaths and infections that occurred in other states.
According to the CDC data in Figure 3b, Florida’s rates were always higher than that of
California’s. California’s rates were significantly lower for much of the pandemic until after the
winter surge, when California’s rates inched closer to that of Florida’s. By the Fall of 2020,
Florida was fully open with most districts urged to open up schools and indoor operations.
Florida’s summer surge was a lot worse, which makes sense as people flock inside to avoid the
hot sun. California’s rates were less severe during the summer. As time passed, California’s most
vulnerable spots were taking big hits of Covid-19. In Southern California, communities are more
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likely to be overcrowded, contain more essential workers, and less compliance with health
restrictions (Hwang and Massa, 2021). The “social vulnerability index” is a scale used by the
CDC to estimate how a disease outbreak will affect a region. Los Angeles in particular has a high
social vulnerability index (Hwang and Massa, 2021). Florida’s Miami-Dade county also ranks
high on the vulnerability index and has demographic features, such as high tourism and
immigrtion rates, that drive Covid-19 rates up. The CDC reported that there are nearly two times
more cases of new variants found in Florida than in California. The lack of statewide protection
measures such as masks and restricted business operations seem to attest to the efficacy of these
measures that aim to contain the pandemic.
Qualitative Approach: Case Study of South Dakota v. Vermont
A state by state comparison of South Dakota and Vermont reveal that although they were
demographically similar and both are led GOP governors, the dramatically different policy
approaches resulted in different pandemic outcomes. This comparison will allow us to control for
demographic features and observe if taking certain policy approaches mattered. Both states have
less than 1 million residents, who mostly reside in rural neighborhoods. South Dakota Governor
Kristi Noem is one of the most skeptical leaders of Covid-19 (Tupper, 2020). Differences
between the approaches of Noem and Scott can be observed in Table 2.5. Noem did not impose
statewide mask mandates and has one of the nation’s worst infection rates. On the other hand,
Vermont’s Governor Phil Scott implemented safety measures and has one of the lowest infection
and mortality rates in the country (Table 2.5). Scott listened to the advice of the CDC and
implemented a statewide lockdown and mask mandate. Scott also strategically balanced the
economic recovery of Vermont while protecting the health of state residents.
Table 2.5 State Containment Measures in Vermont and South Dakota
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Vermont

South Dakota

Infection per 100,000
(January 4)

1249

11346

Mortality per 100,000
(January 4)

22

171

Total Party Control

Split

Republican

Mask Mandates December

Statewide mandates

No statewide mandates

Travel

Strict restrictions

No travel restrictions

Restaurant Closures (Jan. 21)

Variation of restricted dine-in
occupancy and take-out

No restaurant occupancy
enforcements

School closures: 2019-2020
year

Closed for academic year

Recommended closure for
2019-2020 school year

School closures: 2020-2021
year

No order in effect

No order in effect

Doctors per capita

367.1

240.4

Total health spending per
capita

639

379

Urbanization index

8.84

8.73

Conservative advantage

-4

31

Trust in government

Average trust

Above average trust

At the beginning of the pandemic, every state had implemented a statewide lockdown.
The case and death rates of South Dakota and Vermont in Figure 4 were relatively similar. Both
states had low numbers at the beginning of the pandemic. During the summer months, the
numbers of South Dakota were rising more quickly than that of Vermont’s.
Figure 4a and 4b. Comparison of South Dakota and Vermont infection and death rates,
respectively.
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These trends reflect Governor Noem’s skepticism of Covid-19 protection measures. Over the
course of the second surge (May to September), Noem doubted whether or not masks actually
prevented the spread of the virus and appeared to ignore CDC advice on limiting social
gatherings outside of the household. Noem invited former President Donald Trump to a Fourth of
July celebration at Mount Rushmore and 7,000 people attended. The following month, hundreds
of thousands of people gathered at the annual Sturgis motorcycle rally in South Dakota (Tupper,
2020). These celebrations appeared to be super spreader events as the number of infections and
deaths increased significantly than in the month prior. While Noem was hosting rallies, Scott
implemented a statewide mask mandate and handed out 300,000 cloth coverings to residents
(Tupper, 2020). When cases were surging nationally during the winter holiday, Scott noticed that
Vermont’s cases rose to 100 for the first time. He responded with new protective measures
including limiting social gatherings, restricting business operations and mandating teleworking
(Tupper, 2020).
Although the demographics between South Dakota and Vermont are relatively similar,
their pandemic outcomes are different. Demographically, Vermont would appear to have been
more severely affected by Covid-19, but the state has shown its resiliency against the virus.
Vermont is near Massachusetts and New York, two states that had high numbers of cases in the
beginning of the pandemic. Vermont also has a higher population density than South Dakota
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(Table 3.2). In the comparison of California and Florida, population density and urbanization
were driving factors of infections and cases. However, between Vermont and South Dakota,
Vermont fared better in the pandemic despite having a significantly higher population density.
This may suggest that there are multiple factors at play when predicting what drives infection
and death rates.
Table 2.5. State profile of Vermont and South Dakota
Vermont

South Dakota

Total Population Estimates

623, 989

884, 659

Population Density

68

12

Percent African American

1.1

2.2

Percent Latino

1.8

3.7

Percent Native American

1.3

9.9

Percent with disabilities,
under age 65 years

10.6

8.1

Percent uninsured

4.4

9.6

Percent of persons over age
65 years

20

17.2

Percent in poverty

10.2

11.9

Unemployment Rate (%)

3.1

3.7

Noem did not implement a stay-at-home order like many other states and did not require
business closures and bragged about not doing so: “South Dakota is the only state in America
that never ordered a single business or church to close… South Dakota never instituted shelter in
place, never mandated people to wear masks” (Cillizza, 2021). Despite the rising numbers,
Noem still continued to claim that the virus was “under control” (Cohen, 2020). Noem stated:
“There are many others who question the effectiveness of masks, and South Dakotans should
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take the time to read this information so they can make informed decisions for themselves and
their families. If folks want to wear a mask, they should be free to do so. Similarly, those who
don’t want to wear a mask shouldn’t be shamed into wearing one. And the government should
not mandate it” (Cohen, 2020). The pandemic outcomes of South Dakota reflects the relaxed
policy approach of allowing people to choose what makes them feel safest, but the outcomes do
not reflect the confidence of Noem in containing the pandemic.
Vermont’s approach was drastically different. In March, Scott issued a lockdown of
non-essential businesses and gradually opened the economy back up. The state embraced
physical distancing and limiting social gathering sizes. The state’s Department of Health also
introduced a test and contact trace system that aimed to contain outbreaks (Cohen, 2020). These
strategies seem to have worked against the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Unlike the GOP
governor of South Dakota, Scott embraced CDC’s recommendations and trusted the data: “Based
on national and regional data on how the virus is spreading - and rather than waiting like other
states have - I feel we need to act now to protect our gains, which have allowed us to reopen
much of our economy.. That’s why today I signed an order, which will strengthen our current
mask mandates, so that we do not take steps backwards and we can stay open into the fall as
people move more interactions indoors” (Cohen, 2020). While the majority of Republican states
are more likely to also have greater infection and mortality rate, Vermont is an exception and
example to the nation that indicates that one’s party affiliation does not have to dictate how they
implement Covid-19 containment measures.
Conclusion
Examining state variation through qualitative and quantitative approaches allows us to
look at pandemic outcomes from various perspectives. The multivariate analysis pinpointed
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certain variables for moments in time and painted a picture of how the pandemic evolved during
the course of 2020. From the results of the quantitative analysis, we found that leadership matters
in mitigating the pandemic. We also found that the pandemic has disproportionately hit people of
color and public health policies need to address pre-existing discrimination that prevent these
communities from accessing quality health care. Furthermore, the case studies allowed us to look
into the attitudes and rhetoric of leaders toward the pandemic. Results of the case study
complemented the results of the multivariate analysis. The next section will determine what these
results mean and discuss social and political implications of these findings.
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3. The Future of Pandemics: Where We Go From Here
Since the Covid-19 pandemic overtook the United States in March 2020, public health
officials have a better understanding of how to control the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Due to
the lack of a federally coordinated response in containing the pandemic, each state government
implemented policies they thought would work best in mitigating the spread of a highly
contagious virus. Various policy approaches led to many variations in pandemic outcomes within
states. In order to determine what the main drivers of pandemic outcomes are, I conducted a
multivariate analysis and compared two case studies of state-by-state metrics. I examined 41
independent variables falling under one of the four explanations, including leadership, state
capacity, demographics, and state culture, against two dependent variables, infection and
mortality rate, over the course of the year 2020. The dependent variables were analyzed over
three different periods of time between March and December that marked the three surges of the
pandemic. In contribution to the body of knowledge that already exists, this study has pinpointed
the explanations that more likely predict the severity of case and death rates within a state. The
following section will describe a summary of the findings, political implications, and the
potential influence this study has on planning for future outbreaks and public policy.
Summary of findings
The mixed-method approach determined how state variations have influenced pandemic
outcomes. Beginning with the multivariate analysis, results suggested that there were certain
variables that predicted case and death rates more than others. For the multivariate analysis, I
hypothesized which explanations would matter in influencing infections and deaths. Beginning
with leadership and governance, I hypothesized:
H1: States with Republican governors had higher mortality and infection rates
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H2: States with women governors had lower mortality and infection rates.
H3: States with Governors that implemented stricter protective measures had lower
mortality and infection rates.
The analysis suggested that party affiliation of the governors and how strict policy
approaches mattered in containing the pandemic. Between the months of May and September,
states with Republican governors had high infection and mortality rates. Governors who also
implemented strict travel restrictions were more likely to have lower rates, which were both
consistent with my predictions. On the other hand, there was no correlation between women
governors and the dependent variables during any period during the pandemic. Unlike my
predictions, the results did not suggest that states led by women governors influenced pandemic
outcomes. Gender did not predict how well a state would perform during the Covid-19
pandemic.
Under the second explanation of state capacity, I hypothesized:
H4: States with greater state capacity, such as testing, doctors, and health spending, had
lower mortality and infection rates.
Other variables that appeared to predict how well a state would perform was doctors per capita.
The results suggested that states with more doctors per capita were more likely to have higher
infection and mortality rate, which can be attributed to urban areas containing more hospitals and
more doctors overall. States that spent more on health care were more likely to have higher
mortalities during the first surge of the pandemic which may suggest that funding is not going
toward direct health services.
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Findings of the third explanation of demographics and contextual factors indicate that
these factors may have influenced the rates of infection and mortality within a state. I
hypothesized:
H5: States with greater urbanization, poverty, and vulnerable communities to disease
such as immigrants, uninsured persons, and people of color had higher mortality and
infection rates.
We found that states with a larger percentage of African Americans and Latinos had greater
infection and mortality rates which supports my hypothesis. Communities vulnerable to disease
are people of color which the results indicate drive the case and death rates. For mortality in
particular, states with a higher percentage of those living in poverty had a higher rate. Other
findings that supported my hypothesis was that the amount of urbanization within a state
influenced rates. For both dependent variables, states with more urban areas were more likely to
have higher rates. The last notable finding within demographic explanations is that the more
uninsured persons residing in the state, the less infection and mortality rates there are. This
finding was unexpected and rejected my original hypothesis.
Findings of state culture, the last explanation, suggested that conservatism plays a role in
how well states perform during Covid-19. I hypothesized:
H6: States with more conservative citizens will have higher infection and death rates.
States with higher conservatism were predicted to have higher infection and mortality rates. This
finding supported my hypothesis and indicating that states with more conservative people were
less likely to have better outcomes.
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The multivariate analysis indicated that many determinants of pandemic outcomes.
Understanding the reasons why these state variations may have predicted Covid-19 infection and
mortality rates can help plan state specific policies for the future.
Results from the multivariate analysis suggest that the variations that led to various
pandemic outcomes within a state were driven by a mix of policy approaches and demographic
advantages and disadvantages. Through a closer look at the variations in the case studies of
California and Florida, both of which had very different policy approaches but similar pandemic
outcomes, the demographic features of the state mattered more in regards to how well the state
performed. For instance, California has many demographic disadvantages such as overcrowding
and a large number of communities of people of color. The example of California indicated that
the demographic disadvantages outweigh the strict policies that Newsom put into place. On the
other hand, Florida has some advantages such as having less nursing home deaths relative to
California, humid climate, and slightly less urbanized areas. The comparison of Vermont and
South Dakota indicate similar lines of reasoning. Although Vermont and South Dakota are
demographically similar, this indicates that both states had demographic advantages that could
have helped in mitigating the pandemic alongside strict policy implementation. For instance,
Vermont’s governor Phil Scott had demographically advantageous qualities that contained the
pandemic alongside his decision to implement strict policies such as statewide mask mandates
and lockdowns. On the other hand, South Dakota’s governors Kristi Noem did not act as Scott
did and her state resulted in having high rates of infections and mortality. Noem allowed large
social gatherings and did not impose any mask mandates or advise business closures. Through
these demographically similar states, this comparison indicates that strict policy implementation
by Noem may have aided her in containing the pandemic as it did in Vermont. This second case
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study shows that having demographic advantages does not aid in mitigating the pandemic alone,
but that in combination with strategic policy approaches, Covid-19 rates can be controlled.
Overall, the case study state-by-state comparisons suggest that states that are demographically
disadvantageous such as California may need to implement better strategies for mitigating future
outbreaks and not through strict policy implementation alone.
Social and Political Implications
State variations resulting in various Covid-19 outcomes did not fall under any particular
explanation. The success of a state in mitigating the pandemic appeared to be the result of a
combination of factors. The four explanations -- leadership, state capacity, demographics and
contextual factors, state culture -- vary in degree of importance in determining pandemic
outcomes. These explanations have also highlighted many social implications of the Covid-19
pandemic that could aid policymakers in how to contain future outbreaks within their state or
nation.
Public Policy and Society
Facilitating national cooperation in the United States among Democrats and Republican
governors and leaders can maximize efforts in protecting citizens from infectious diseases.
Rhetoric of many governors urged people to collaborate and work together on stopping the
spread of Covid-19. Collaboration could have been focused on wearing masks in order to protect
others and following lockdown rules to protect immunocompromised individuals. The pandemic
which presented an opportunity for residents and leaders to work together, has only aggravated
increasing political polarization. Mitigating the pandemic in the United States was not focused
on the health and well-being of others as it was in other countries. One’s behavior and attitude
about containing the pandemic appeared to depend on the political affiliation of the person and
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was independent of one’s age group or health status. In theory, public health should not be driven
by politics but by scientific evidence. As one of the countries with the most severe Covid-19
cases in the world, the United States and its leaders allowed themselves to be distracted by
polarization which has cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Although state leaders worked
individually to contain the pandemic within their own state, they missed the opportunity to come
together to implement statewide masks mandates, limit social gatherings, and allow safe business
operations as a nation in order to combat the pandemic. Moving forward, political polarization
that will arise from future crises should be addressed in order to maximize the ability of the
United States to create a solution to a national problem.
A main driver of polarization was rooted in a leader’s decision to implement protective
measures such as mask mandates and stay-at-home orders. Although the findings of this study
suggests that success in mitigating the pandemic is a combination of demographic advantages as
well as adopting an effective policy approach, the decision on whether or not to implement
protective measures were not based on science. Many notable governors took the advice of the
CDC and implemented policies recommended by disease experts. As shown by the case study
comparing South Dakota and Vermont, Republican affiliation does not necessarily mean that the
leader cannot embrace scientific expert opinions. On the other hand, some leaders were skeptical
about the efficacy of masks despite its strong evidence and recommendations in containing the
spread of the pandemic. The use of masks was scientifically proven to contain air droplets, a
main transmission method of Covid-19. The decision to not implement masks began to be
associated with Republican leadership and politics, rather than based on the evidence.
In addition to speculations about how political parties may have predicted pandemic
outcomes, there was also speculation on how gender may have influenced case and death rates.
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Gender did not appear to drive rates which suggests that feminine leadership styles did not have
a significant impact on how well a state contained the pandemic. Gendered notions of what
makes an effective leader during a crisis should be given a second-thought. At the time of the
pandemic there were only 9 women governors. The small sample size of women leaders may
have contributed to this finding. Nonetheless, this finding suggests that there are other factors
and variations at play in determining how well a state contained the Covid-19 virus.
The second explanation, state capacity, included some measures that explain how state
variations resulted in various pandemic outcomes. The first variable to suggest correlation to
infection and death rates was doctors per capita. Doctors tend to be more concentrated in urban
areas than rural ones. This indicates that physicians residing in urban areas are also at risk,
potentially a higher risk, of contracting Covid-19 and are counted in the death toll. Hundreds of
physicians across the nation died due to Covid-19 while attempting to heal those with the virus in
hospitals. Many more health workers died due to Covid-19 as well and were counted in the death
tolls. The suggested correlation between doctors per capita and mortality rates suggests that the
effects of the pandemic impacted infections and deaths among essential workers. Essential
workers were particularly vulnerable at the beginning of the pandemic when states did not have
enough personal protective equipment (PPE) to hand out. Additionally, the correlation between
doctors per capita and pandemic outcomes may have also been due to these areas being
overwhelmed by Covid-19 patients. According to the multivariate analysis, doctors may have
gotten a better grasp on how to better organize hospital flow of patients, secured more
equipment, and better understood the risks of Covid-19 in order to prevent its spread among
health care workers. Many essential workers did not have the luxury of being able to lockdown.
In theory, more urban states would also have more essential workers. State leaders should have
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thought about how to best protect this working class while not making them sacrifice their own
lives for the sake of the economy. Although there were little measures of state capacity that were
significant, the doctors per capita variable suggests that protecting essential workers is vital to
not only lower case and death rates among themselves but also among others.
The third explanation, demographics and contextual factors, revealed systemic inequities
in the U.S. that have resulted in disproportionate pandemic outcomes affecting certain
populations, particularly African American and Latinx. The spread of the disease is not only a
threat to national and international security, but also a universal threat because anybody has the
capacity to develop sickness. The threat of a disease grows exponentially larger if the novel
disease emerges and it is incurable and potentially contagious. Although the spread of highly
infectious diseases can be a major threat to humans due to its ability to spread across borders,
diseases do not affect everyone equally due to socioeconomic status and access to quality care.
Communities that have limited access to quality health care, sanitary resources, and the financial
means to purchase protective equipment will be more susceptible to diseases. Preventively
increasing access to health resources, not just during a pandemic, should in theory improve
public health overall. These communities are not only vulnerable to disease but other injustices
as well including racial discrimination. The combination of a Black Lives Matter protest during
the summer of 2020 also highlighted the perpetuating injustices that BIPOC continue to face
which have only been exacerbated by Covid-19. In the future, the realm of public health will
have to include more perspectives from people of color and how these disparities can be
addressed.
The findings of the fourth explanation, state culture, has some political implications.
Conservatism was a main driver of outbreaks and mortalities during the pandemic. Similarly to
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the reasoning behind why Republican-led states have higher rates, states with more conservatism
did not appear to contain the pandemic as well as less conservative states. The political
implication of this finding is how to engage with more conservative states on issues considering
the polarized state of the nation. This finding suggests that within conservatism are sentiments
that prevent people from wanting to mitigate the pandemic, which could include refusals to wear
masks and social distance. This finding also suggests that pandemic outcomes depend on
individuals’ attitudes on the pandemic and how one’s behaviors have had consequences. More
conservative states also may also implement less Covid-19 policies. In doing so, the burden fo
Covid-19 differs between states which does not aid the national effort to contain the virus. These
unintended consequences of conservatism on pandemic outcomes suggests that a shift in how
conservative states implement policies for the benefit of the nation should be considered.
Future Research
A cross state comparison on policies on Covid-19 could be expanded to analyze other
prior and future pandemics. The examination of Covid-19 policies in this study could be applied
to analyze the impact of other policies that are specifically implemented during crises. For
pandemics, these policies include masks and stay-at-home orders. For other crises, these could
include policies mandated to rebuild infrastructure or provide financial relief for affected
communities. More specific analysis of leadership actions during crises can also be more deeply
explored. This study’s contributions include how party affiliation influences infections and
deaths and how gender does not. This research could be expanded with more detailed
descriptions of leadership by including governor rhetoric on the enforcement of policies and
attitudes on Covid-19. Language and rhetoric from national and state leaders may have attributed
to how citizens perceived the threat of the virus and influenced their behavior. For state capacity,
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future research can include the impact of all health care workers on Covid-19 success rather than
just doctors. An analysis of how all health workers have influenced pandemic outcomes may
have provided a more expansive analysis on state capacity and its impact on infection rates and
death. More specific descriptions of the four explanations could provide a broader understanding
of state variations on Covid-19 pandemic outcomes.
Conclusion
Understanding how state variations influenced Covid-19 infection and mortality rates can
help policy makers navigate future pandemics. Covid-19 has provided an opportunity for U.S.
leaders to learn about how to best contain disease outbreaks. The lack of a federally led response
in the beginning of the outbreak increased the severity of the outbreak in the U.S. Due to various
responses from states with different demographic pressures, the Covid-19 pandemic suggests that
state successes on mitigating the pandemic is a combination of policy approaches and
demographic advantages. According to the case studies, demographic pressures drive infection
and mortality rates despite policy implementations (i.e. California). Vermont performed well due
to strict Covid-19 policy in addition to demographic advantages. One lesson that governors can
take away from the pandemic is recognizing their state’s demographic advantages and
weaknesses. In doing so, they may be better prepared for preparing for future crises that may be
unique to that state. Similarly to how diseases affect communities differently, diseases also affect
states differently. Each governor should be familiar with what their state’s weaknesses are in
order to contain the spread of a novel virus as much as possible in the future. Being aware of
demographic disadvantages and implementing the recommended pandemic policy can ultimately
prepare a state for containing and mitigating future infectious outbreaks.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Sources and Codes of Variables (Variable descriptions pending)
Variable

Source

Column1

Infection rates

CDC 2020

Raw Numbers

Mortality rates

CDC 2020

Raw Numbers

Party Control of
Government

Ballotpedia 2020

0: Democrat/ Split; 1: Republican

State Restrictions

NPR 2020

0: No; 1: Statewide; 2: Varies

Mask requirements
statewide

National
Academy for State
Health Policy
2020
0: no masks; 1: masks required

Travel restrictions
statewide

National
Academy for State 0: no travel restrictions; 1: loose
Health Policy
travel restrictions; 2: strict travel
2020
restrictions

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables
- Governance and
Leadership

Restaurant enforcements NPR 2020

0: Dine-in allowed; 1: varies; 2:
takeout/delivery only
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School closures

Education Week
2020

0: Varies by school district; 1: Closed
for academic year; 2: Closed until
further notice; 3: Recommended
closure

Identity of Leaders:
Women leaders

Center for
American Women
and Politics 2020

0: Woman; 1: Man

Upcoming governor
elections

Ballotpedia 2020

0: No; 1: Yes

Upcoming legislative
elections

Ballotpedia 2020

0: No; 1: Yes

Governor approval
ratings

Ballotpedia 2020

Raw Numbers

Doctors per capita

AAMC 2020

Raw numbers

Hospitals per capita

American
Hospital Directory
2020
Raw Numbers

Staffed beds per capita

American
Hospital Directory
2020
Raw Numbers

Health spending per
capita

Business Insider
2017

Raw Numbers

People without health
insurance

U.S. Census 2019
(p.14)

Raw Numbers

Independent Variables
- State Capacity
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Johns Hopkins:
Coronavirus
Resource Center
2020

Raw Numbers

NPR 2020

0: currently meets estimated need; 1:
will meet estimated need; 2: does not
meet estimated need; 3: no data
available

Level of urbanization

FiveThirtyEight
2020

Raw Numbers

Population: people in
poverty

U.S. Census 2019

Raw Numbers

Household income

World Population
Review 2020

Raw Numbers

Population density

World Population
Review 2020

Raw Numbers

Total population

World Population
Review 2020

Raw Numbers

Population: African
American

Kaiser Family
Foundation 2019

Raw Numbers

Population: Latino

Kaiser Family
Foundation 2019

Raw Numbers

Population: Native
American

World Population
Review 2020

Raw Numbers

Daily testing (7-day
average) by population

Investment in contact
tracing
Independent Variables
- Contextual Factors
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Independent Variables
- Social Structures

Political Ideology by
State

News Gallup 2019 Raw Numbers (Pct. Pts)

State culture (Elazar)

Morgan, D., &
Watson, S. (1991)

0: moralistic; 1: individualistic; 2:
traditionalistic

Trust in government

Gallup 2013

0: no data; 1: below average trust; 2:
Average trust: 3: Above average trust

Creation of racial task
forces

National
Academy for State
Health Policy
0: no task force; 1: task force
2020
implemented
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